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Four experiments were conducted to assess whether or not rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatta) could represent the unperceived movements of a stimulus. Subjects were tested on
2 computerized tasks, HOLE (monkeys) and LASER (humans and monkeys), in which
subjects needed to chase or shoot at, respectively, a moving target that either remained visible
or became invisible for a portion of its path of movement. Response patterns were analyzed
and compared between target-visible and target-invisible conditions. Results of Experiments
1, 2, and 3 demonstrated that the monkeys are capable of extrapolating movement. That this
extrapolation involved internal representation of the target's invisible movement was sug-
gested but not confirmed. Experiment 4, however, demonstrated that the monkeys are capable
of representing the invisible displacements of a stimulus.
The ability of nonhuman primates to represent internally
the unperceived movements of a stimulus object has been
the focus of object permanence research for years (see
Natale & Antinucci, 1989, and Dore & Dumas, 1987, for
reviews). Invisible displacement tasks, used to assess the
representational capacity of a subject, are notoriously diffi-
cult for monkeys to solve nonassociatively. In an invisible
displacement task, the subject is shown a food object that is
placed into an opaque container. This container is then
moved behind a screen or under a block where the food
object is transferred from the container to behind the screen
or under the block without the subject's being able directly
to perceive this transfer. The container is then moved out
from behind the screen, and shown empty to the subject.
After seeing the container empty, if the subject searches
behind the screen or the appropriate screen if there is more
than one, rather than search around the now empty con-
tainer, it is presumed that the subject is able to represent
internally the invisible displacement of the food object from
the container to behind the screen. However, subjects often
can solve this task associatively, so there are usually a
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variety of control procedures used as well. Currently, there
are no consensual reports of monkeys being able to solve
this task by using a representational process. Thus, it has
been conclude_d that monkeys lack the representational ca-
pacity to infer the movements of an unperceived object
(Dumas, 1992; Natale & Antinucci, 1989).
Movement representation has not been a widely re-
searched phenomenon in nonhuman primates. Very little is
known about how nonhuman primates perceive and respond
to the unseen movements of objects as might occur in a
variety of contexts. There is some evidence to suggest that
baboons are capable of representing internally the unper-
ceived rotations of a stimulus. Using a mental rotation
paradigm, Vauclair, Fagot, and Hopkins (1993) found that
the decision time for baboons to make a correct comparison
between a sample stimulus and a rotated version of it
increased linearly with an increase in the angular disparity
between the two stimuli, which is the same pattern found in
humans (though it seems to be lateralized in baboons). The
sample stimulus itself does not rotate (and hence is not
directly perceived) but rather is "imagined" by the subject.
The analogical response pattern demonstrated by the ba-
boons suggests that they, like humans, can represent inter-
nally the unperceived rotations of a stimulus.
Representing the unperceived rotations of a stimulus has
been investigated in one nonprimate species. When a testing
paradigm was used in which pigeons observed a clock hand
stimulus move at a constant rate, disappear, and then reap-
pear at a subsequent location, Neiworth and Rilling (1987)
found that, after training on specific degrees of stimulus
rotation, pigeons could correctly identify violations of clock
hand movement on novel trials (a violation would occur if
the hand reappeared at an inappropriate location given its
constant speed of movement as indicated by the delay
between stimulus disappearance and reappearance). That is,
the pigeons could discriminate between appropriate and
inappropriate locations of clock hand reappearance when
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thehandreappearedatnoveldegreesof rotationfromits
initial,visiblelocation.NeiworthandRillinginterpreted
theseresultsasevidencefortheuseof imagerybypigeons.
If thepigeonswererespondingonthebasisof "imagining"
theunseenmovementsoftheclockhandstimulus,it would
suggestthattheywererepresentinginternallytheunper-
ceivedrotationsofthestimulus.
Thoughthetasksusedinobjectpermanenceandmental
rotationparadigmsarequitedifferentin procedureand
likelyindemand,theyaredesignedtoexamineasubject's
abilityto representi ternallystimulusmovementthathas
notbeendirectlyperceived.It isimportanttoclarifythatthe
abilityto representinternallytheunperceivedportionsof
stimulusmovementis theabilitytorepresenti visibledis-
placement.Displacement means movement (be it a discrete
event as in invisible displacement tasks or a relatively
continuous event as in mental rotation), and if the move-
ment is made to be invisible in one way or another, then
empirically, not necessarily subjectively, invisible displace-
ment (or displacement transformation as is involved in
mental rotation; Gallistel, 1990) has occurred.
In the current series of experiments, the ability of rhesus
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to represent invisible displace-
ment was examined through a target prediction paradigm,
which involves the use of a computerized testing system
(CTS). In target prediction tasks, subjects contact a moving
target with a joystick-controlled cursor. Contact can be
made by either chasing and catching a target or by shooting
at the target from a stationary turret. Washburn and col-
leagues (Washburn, 1992a; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992)
have demonstrated that rhesus monkeys, like liumans, re-
spond predictively to a moving target. Whether subjects are
chasing moving targets (CHASE) or firing shots at a mov-
ing target (LASER), they use paths of movement or shot
angles that approximate significantly the hypothetically op-
timal path (or shot angle) that would be used if one were
predicting the movement of the target. Moreover, for the
LASER task, the monkeys (like humans) are able to deter-
mine whether or not a shot will intersect with the moving
target, and they can abort errant shots (shots that would have
missed the target) before they have traversed even half the
distance to the target.
The predictive quality of the monkeys' responses on
target prediction tasks provided us with an opportunity to
test their performance when the target undergoes invisible
displacement. Unlike these previous tasks, the tasks used in
the current set of experiments involved predicting target
movement when a portion of its path became occluded. In
the HOLE task, we created an apparent (two-dimensional)
occluder by generating from the computer a visibly outlined
region on the monitor in which target movement became
invisible. In the LASER task we made the occluder more
real by placing an opaque card on a quadrant of the monitor,
blocking visibility of a portion of target movement. The use
of an occluder, be it apparent or real, allowed us to examine
the ability of rhesus macaques to represent internally the
invisible displacements of target movement.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects. Two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; Abel and
Baker; Charles River Laboratories, Wilmington, MA) were tested
in this experiment. At the time of this experiment, these male
monkeys were 9 years of age and had been trained to manipulate
a joystick to respond to a variety of computer-generated tasks
(Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hop-
kins, 1989; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1994). Each monkey was
tested unrestrained within its home cage and was not deprived of
food or water for purposes of testing.
Apparatus. The monkeys were trained and tested with the
Language Research Center's Computerized Test System (LRC-
CTS), which consists of a battery of software tasks and the
computer hardware required to administer them (see Rumbaugh et
al., 1989). Each of the LRC-CTS test stations consisted of a
computer monitor and a standard analog joystick, both connected
to a 386sx computer. The subjects were required on each trial to
manipulate the joystick to direct a computer-generated cursor (a
1.25 cm × 1.25 cm white plus sign, +) into contact with two-
dimensional, multicolored stimuli generated by the computer and
randomly presented on the monitor. Sound feedback was provided
via an external speaker-amplifier located on top of the monitor. A
97-mg fruit-flavored chow pellet (P. J. Noyes, Lancaster, Nil) was
automatically dispensed to reinforce trials that were completed
correctly.
Task. In this task (called HOLE), the subject had to manipulate
the joystick so as to bring the cursor into contact with a 1.25
cm × 1.25 cm blue square (the target). Each trial began with the
presentation of a circle in the center of a black computer screen.
The circle was outlined in white and 15 cm in diameter. The cursor
and the target were also presented on the screen, each in random
position (but neither within the confines of the circle). The target
stimulus moved continuously on the screen in a diagonal pattern,
"bouncing" off the screen boundaries at 45° angles. The target
moved at a speed of approximately 3 cm/s when it was outside of
the large circle; inside the circle, the target changed in appearance
(see below) and traveled at approximately I cm/s. The slower
target speed within the circle allowed enough time for subjects to
move the cursor around the region before the target reappeared.
The cursor could not enter the large circle. Thus, the circle pre-
sented a semipermeable barrier through which the target could
travel (albeit slowly) but around which the cursor had to move.
The task was designed to reveal whether the monkeys would learn
to circumnavigate the large circle so as to catch the target at the
point where it exited the barrier.
Auditory feedback and pellets were provided whenever the
subject "caught" the moving target, regardless of whether or not
the target had moved through the circle. For each trial, the com-
puter recorded response time (the time from first joystick move-
ment until collision between the cursor and target) as well as the
x-y coordinates of every cursor and target movement made during
the trial.
Procedure. The HOLE task was administered under two con-
ditions. On some trials (visible condition), the target changed into
a 0.75 cm × 0.75 cm white box whenever it was inside the large
circle. On other trials (invisible condition), the target was not
visible against the black background of the screen while it was
inside the large circle. In all other ways (speeds, direction of
movement, etc.) the two conditions were identical. Thus, in the
former condition the subjects could move the cursor to a point
where the visible target would emerge from the circle, hut in the
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latterconditionthesubjectswererequiredtodetermineanappro-
priatepointofintersectionwiththeinvisibletargetonthebasisof
itstrajectorywhenitdisappearedintothecircle.
Bothanimalswereinitiallytrainedonlyin thevisible-target
condition.Beforethisexperiment,eachmonkeyhadperformed
manythousandsoftrialsoncomputerasksrequiringthemtocatch
movingtargets(albeitnonewithsemipermeableo stacles);asa
consequence,th ylearnedquicklytocatchthemovingtarget.
Subsequently,eachanimalperformedanadditional2,000trials,in
10blocksof200trials.Trial condition (visible vs. invisible) was
alternated across trials in this condition.
Results
In both conditions, the monkeys were frequently able to
catch the target before it entered the circle even once. These
trials were omitted from subsequent analysis. On the re-
maining trials, the distance in degrees between the cursor
and the target was computed each time that the target exited
the circle. These distances were averaged across blocks of
200 trials for each monkey. No evidence of trend was
observed across blocks of trials for either monkey in either
condition; that is, neither monkey generally improved in
performance with practice. Given this, the data were
grouped by animal and analyzed as a function of visible
versus invisible target condition.
A significant main effect was observed for target condi-
tion, F(1, 18) = 109.04, p < .01. The monkeys were
significantly closer to the target as it exited the circle in the
visible condition than when the target was invisible (58 ° and
98 °, respectively). In fact, on almost all of the invisible
trials the monkeys chased the target until it disappeared into
the circle, whereupon the animals stopped manipulating the
joystick and permitted the cursor to remain in position until
the target reappeared as it emerged from the circle. In
contrast, the monkeys generally approximated the target's
point of exit from the circle when the target was visible
(comparing the average distance observed for this condition
with the distance expected by chance alone; 90°). Abel was
significantly better at moving to the point of exit from the
circle than was Baker, F(I, 18) = 28.41,p < .01 (M = 67 °
vs. 89 °, respectively); however, this effect did not interact
with trial condition (p > .05), indicating that the pattern of
results was comparable for the two monkeys.
Discussion
These results provide no evidence that the monkeys can
respond to targets that disappear on the screen. In contrast,
the data suggest that the monkeys had no idea what to do
when the target disappeared, despite being fully capable of
circumnavigating the circle to capture visibly moving tar-
gets. Perhaps the monkeys lacked the ability to generate and
represent internally the continued path of the invisible target
based on the trajectory of movement that characterized its
entry into the circle.
Alternatively, this suggestion contradicts the findings of
Washburn (1992b) that these same rhesus monkeys could
estimate the invisible continuation of a "shot" and deter-
mine accurately whether the shot would hit or miss a com-
puter graphics target. The tendency for the monkeys to do
nothing while the target was invisible (rather than to move
the cursor to a point that does not correspond to the appro-
priate target trajectory) suggests an alternate interpretation.
Before the present experiment, the only experience the
animals had with target stimuli that became invisible was
with memory tasks such as delayed matching to sample and
sameness-difference (e.g., Washburn and Rumbaugh,
1991a). Once the cursor is brought into contact with the
target stimuli in these memory tasks, the targets disappear
for a retention interval of various lengths. During the reten-
tion interval, the cursor remains on the screen but does not
move with manipulations of the joystick. Only after the
retention interval, when stimuli are again presented on the
screen, can the subject respond. Given the pattern of present
results, including the description of each monkey's behavior
in the invisible target condition, it seems possible that the
monkeys interpreted the disappearance of the target into the
circle as a type of retention interval, during which respond-
ing was fruitless. The next experiment was designed to
assess this possibility.
Experiment 2
Method
The subjects, apparatus, and procedure for this experiment were
identical to those of Experiment 1, with the exception of one
change to the HOLE task. In the previous experiment, the target
moved continuously in a diagonal pattern around the screen
whether or not the cursor was moving. In almost all other tasks that
the monkeys had experienced, target movement was contingent on
cursor movement, such that all was stationary on the screen unless
the joystick was being manipulated (see Rumbaugh et at., 1989).
For Experiment 2, target movement was made contingent on
cursor movement. At any time that the cursor stopped, the target
also stopped, whether or not it was in the circle. Note that this
procedure required subjects to manipulate the joystick and thus
move the cursor continually so as to draw the target out of the
circle. Any trial in which the subject moved the cursor and then
released the joystick (so that neither the cursor nor the target
moved) for 60 consecutive seconds was aborted and a new trial
was initiated.
Each subject performed 2,000 trials under these parameters in
the visible target condition. Subsequently, each monkey performed
2,000 trials in which target condition (visible and invisible) was
alternated across trials. As in Experiment 1, trials were discarded
in which the target was caught before it entered the circle at least
once.
Results
Each monkey rapidly learned the task under the new
parameters. More important, the monkeys immediately gen-
eralized to the invisible target trials, moving the cursor
around so as to keep the invisible target moving through the
circle until it reappeared and was caught. Only 8% of the
trials in the invisible condition were aborted because the
monkeys stopped moving the joystick, a number that was
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notdifferentfromthepercentageobservedfor thevisible
condition(5%;p > .05).
In the analysis of average distance data, both monkeys
exhibited slight but reliable improvement across blocks of
trials in the invisible condition (improving from an average
distance of 32 ° away from target's exit site in the first
blocks to 21 ° in the terminal blocks of trials rautocorrelation =
.49, p < .05). Consequently, analysis of variance was
deemed inappropriate for the present analysis; however, the
subjects were reliably closer to the target in the visible than
the invisible condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < .01).
Although the mean distance from the cursor to the target in
the invisible condition (36 °) was larger than when the target
remained visible (20°), performance in both conditions was
substantially better than in Experiment I. Unlike in the prior
experiment, subjects were consistently closer to the target's
point of exit than the difference expected by chance (90 °)
even when the target disappeared while inside the circle
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < .05). These differences are
illustrated in Figure I.
Discussion
The monkeys were able to estimate, with high levels of
accuracy, the place where an invisible target would emerge
from the circle based on the trajectory of movement that
characterized the target's entry into the circle. It is notewor-
thy that performance in both conditions was improved when
target movement was made contingent on cursor movement.
This was the case despite the fact that the subjects were
required to move the cursor back and forth around the exit
site to keep the target moving through the circle. That is,
even if the monkeys could generate an accurate exit site
from the trajectory of target entry, they could not simply
move to that location and wait for the target to reappear. The
PATH
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Figure 1. The average distance between the cursor and the exit
point of a target (given an illustrative target trajectory) in Exper-
iment I visible (V1) and invisible (I1) conditions, compared with
Experiment 2 visible (V2) and invisible (I2) conditions. Chance-
chance accuracy.
cursor had to be moved in order to produce movement of the
target (even when it was invisible), and this movement
undoubtedly inflated the error for these measures. Never-
theless, improvement over Experiment 1 performance was
most dramatic for the invisible target condition, where per-
formance came to approximate levels of accuracy typical
for the visible target condition. This suggests that the mon-
keys could extrapolate the movement of the invisible target,
perhaps even by representing its intermediate positions
across the circle. Additional evidence that the monkeys
were responding on the basis of inferred movement of the
invisible target is provided by the fact that the monkeys did
continue to move the joystick when the target disappeared
into the circle so as to keep the target moving through the
circle.
Of course, each monkey had performed thousands of
HOLE trials by the time these experiments were complete.1
Thus, it might be argued that the animals had simply learned
a series of entry-exit associations that they could use to
capture the target efficiently without extrapolating and rep-
resenting internally the movements of the invisible target.
We designed Experiment 3 to test this suggestion. Novel
target-movement paths were introduced to determine
whether the monkeys were responding on the basis of entry
trajectory or more simple associations. If the monkeys were
responding using spatial associations, they should respond
to these probe trials by moving to an exit point previously
associated with the particular point of entry. Alternatively,
individuals capable of representing the invisible displace-
ments of the target should be relatively unaffected by the
particular trajectory presented on any given trial.
Experiment 3
Method
The monkeys, apparatus, and procedures used in this experiment
were identical to those in Experiment 2, except for a single change
to the HOLE task. On each invisible target trial, the target moved
at a randomly selected angle relative to horizon (25*, 45°, or 65°)
across the screen and through the circle. As in previous experi-
ments, the target moved at a 45° angle on all trials in which the
target remained visible.
Each monkey performed 200 trials of the HOLE task with these
parameters, alternating on each trial between the visible and in-
visible conditions. Given the number of potential entry-exit sites,
each of the trials in which a movement angle other than 45* was
used represents a novel transfer test for this experiment.
For comparison, 10 human volunteers were also tested in this
experiment. Each of these undergraduate students (6 women and 4
men, ages 18-34 years, who participated in exchange for class
credit) performed 48 trials of the HOLE task in which the target
i In fact, the experiments reported here were conducted over a
span of several years, during which time the monkeys performed
many thousands of trials of HOLE and other tasks. Between
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, for example, thousands of HOLE
trials were performed; however, no improvements in HOLE per-
formance were observed until the conditions of Experiment 2 were
introduced.
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moved at 45 ° angles and remained visible or became invisible on
alternate trials. In a second block of 48 trials, the target moved
either at a 25 °, 45 °, or a 65 ° angle, which was randomized each
trial. Again, whether or not the target remained visible while in the
circle was alternated across trials. The initial position and direction
of movement for the target was randomized each trial.
Results
The average distance between the cursor and the invisible
target's exit point when it emerged from the circle, as a
function of species and movement angle, is shown in Table
1. Human participants missed the exit point of a visible
target by an average of only 14 ° . For the monkeys, the
average distance on the visible target trials was comparable
to those reported in the previous experiments (22°). Perfor-
mance in the probe conditions (invisible target, 25 ° or 65 °
movement) was comparable for both species to performance
on the 45 ° trials. The observed distances were much less
than the 20 ° difference in error that would be expected if the
subjects moved on the basis of simple stimulus-response
associations to a point 45 ° across the circle from each point
of target entry.
Discussion
Taken together, these experiments suggest that the mon-
keys can respond appropriately to stimuli that become in-
visible, and that they do so by using a generalizable process
such as the extrapolation of movement. These findings
cannot be attributed to low-level associations between stim-
ulus and response conditions.
However, the ability to determine the point of exit from a
barrier does not necessarily require the internal representa-
tion of each target movement within the barrier. In fact, it is
not certain that the monkeys perceived the circle as an
occluder--that is, as an area behind which or within which
the target can be invisible--at all.
We conducted Experiment 4 to provide clearer evidence
of subjects' ability to represent the intermediate points of
invisible stimulus movement. A new task (LASER) was
used that did not require subjects to wait for the target to
reappear in order to contact it. Shots could be fired at the
target while it was moving behind the occluder. By creating
a real rather than an apparent occluder, we could determine
more definitively whether or not subjects were capable of
representing the invisible displacements of a moving target.
Table 1
Error Estimating Exit Point of Invisible Targets as a
Function of Target Movement, Angle, and Species
Target angle
Species 25 ° 45 ° 65 °
Human 26 ° 24 ° 29 °
Monkey 27 ° 30 ° 36 °
Experiment 4
In the previous experiments, the circle provided a "virtual
occluder" that hid portions of target movement. However,
the impenetrability of the circle to the cursor limited the
flexibility of responding, obscuring whether or not subjects
understood that the target was moving invisibly through the
hole and were responding on the basis of that knowledge.
For the present study, the LASER task was administered
either with or without a real mask--a piece of black card-
board attached to part of the screen, creating a region that
occluded target movement. Importantly, the target moved
from left to right or vice versa in a zigzag pattern, and it
began in a randomly selected location for each trial. Hence,
the target's movement, though at predictable 45 ° angles,
differed on each trial as a function of its initial location and
direction of heading for each trial. Because of its zigzag
motion, the target frequently changed directions, like a
deflection. These deflections are important because they
would go unperceived when the target was occluded.
If subjects failed to recognize the cardboard as an oc-
cluder (that is, they did not recognize that the target existed
and was moving behind the mask), it was expected that they
would either fire shots in random directions or not respond
at all until the target reappeared. However, if the monkeys
realized that the target both existed and continued to move
behind the cardboard, they should have directed shots to-
ward where the target was going (i.e., at a point of inter-
section ahead of the moving target), even if this point itself
was not visible.
Method
Subjects. The same two monkeys used in the HOLE experi-
ments were tested in this experiment. Subjects were 11 years old
at the time of this experiment. Six human volunteers were also
tested. The undergraduate students (2 women and 4 men, ages 21
to 30 years) participated in exchange for course credit.
Apparatus. The same apparatus as that used in the previous
experiments was used for this study. In Experiment 4, however, all
subjects were tested on the LASER task (which permits responses
to be made while the target is behind an occluder, rather than
encouraging the animals to position a cursor at the point where a
target will exit the occluder as in the HOLE task). The LASER task
has been described in detail elsewhere (Washburn, 1992b). For the
LASER task, subjects needed to shoot at a target moving across the
monitor. The target was a blue square (3 cm × 2 cm), which
moved at a speed of 4 cm/s across the top 7.5 cm of the monitor
in a zigzag (or sawtooth) pattern. A shot could be fired from a
stationary turret located at the middle bottom of the monitor (see
Figure 2). Shots were fired at an angle corresponding to the
direction of joystick deflection and could be aborted by moving the
joystick handle in a downward direction. One trial consisted of
the target's moving back and forth until the subject successfully hit
the target. Hence, each trial may have consisted of several com-
pleted but errant shots, several aborted shots, and one accurate
shot. When the target was hit, a reward tone occurred, one pellet
was dispensed, and the screen was cleared for a 5-s intertrial
interval. The initial target position and movement direction was
randomly selected each trial.
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Figure 2. Depiction of the appearance of the screen in Experi-
ment 4. Note that the mask region was covered by cardboard in the
experimental condition. In addition, optimal and average shots,
given the target position and path of movement, are reported for
monkeys in the baseline (MB) and experimental (ME) conditions,
for humans in the baseline (HB) and expeimental (HE) conditions.
Procedure. The rhesus monkeys initially performed 100 trials
on this version of the LASER task to establish baseline perfor-
mance. Subjects were then tested for another 100 trials on the same
task but with one rectangular piece of cardboard attached to the
upper left quadrant of the monitor for I subject and to the upper
right quadrant for the other subject. This cardboard mask was
covered with black electrical tape (to prevent light from passing
through) and measured 7.5 cm high × 12.5 cm wide. It was
attached with tape to the surface of the monitor such that it
occluded a portion of the viewing surface (see Figure 2). The edge
of the cardboard mask was positioned approximately 3 cm from
the side of the monitor, so that the target was visible on both sides
of the cardboard and no image of the target could be seen through
the mask.
For each trial, the pixel-by-pixei coordinates for every shot and
target movement were recorded on the computer. These data were
analyzed to determine (a) the angle at which a shot was fired; (b)
whether or not the target was in the region of the cardboard mask
(which would have been in place to occlude the target only in the
experimental condition) when the shot was initiated; (c) whether
the shot was aborted, was a miss, or a hit; and (d) whether the shot
was fired ahead or behind the moving target. The angle of each
shot that was initiated while the target was behind the mask (or in
the corresponding position for baseline trials) was also compared
with the angle that would have characterized the shot if it had been
fired directly at the target, and to the optimal angle for intersection.
The optimal angle was determined by the target's empirical loca-
tion (be it visible or occluded), heading, and speed of movement.
This comparison of angles was used in a correlational analysis,
described in detail elsewhere (Washburn, 1992a; Washburn &
Rumbaugh, 1992).
Each human participant completed 50 trials of the LASER task
in the baseline condition (no mask) and 50 trials 2 in the experi-
mental condition (with the cardboard mask). The order in which
these two conditions were administered was counterbalanced
across participants.
Resul_
We used a difference of proportions (two-tailed z) test to
analyze the averaged human and monkey data. Humans and
monkeys performed similarly with respect to the average
number of shots required to hit the target when it was visible
or invisible (human: 2.89 and 3.74 shots/trial, respectively;
monkeys: 2.66 and 3.47 shots/trial, respectively). More
important, however, humans and monkeys did not differ
significantly in either their hit rates for each version of the
task or in the degree to which hit rates were disrupted by the
presence of the occluder. The hit rate is based on only those
shots that were initiated while the target was occluded or in
the corresponding, but visible, region of the monitor in the
baseline version. On average, 25% of the monkeys' shots
and 27% of the humans' shots were hits when the target was
occluded (z = -5.55, p > .05). When the target was visible,
48% of the monkeys' shots and 36% of the humans' shots
were hits (p > .05).
That only one fourth of subjects' shots were hits reflects
how difficult the occluded version of the task was. Even
when the moving target was visible, achieving an intercep-
tion was not so easy for either monkeys or humans. It is also
noteworthy that when the target was occluded, neither the
humans nor the monkeys ever aborted a shot that would
have hit the target. Both groups accurately aborted shots that
would have missed.
This similarity in monkey and human performance is
further elucidated in the analysis of shot-path patterns (for
complete shots initiated while the target was in the mask
region). For monkeys responding in the visible target con-
dition, the angle at which a shot was fired correlated
significantly with both the location of the target (r = .60;
rc,_t = .26, p < .01) and the angle for optimal intersection
with the moving target (r = .65). The angle of shots taken
by humans was also significantly correlated with the loca-
tion of the visible target (r = .57) and the angle of optimal
intersection with the target (r = .71). Thus, subjects tended
to fire ahead of the moving target, at an angle that generally
but imperfectly approximated the hypothetical angle of op-
timal intersection (which was itself highly correlated with
target position in this study, r = .88). Figure 2 depicts this
pattern, with a typical baseline condition shot generated
from the multiple regression formula provided by this anal-
ysis, and with comparable data from human participants.
In the experimental condition, the angle at which the
monkeys shot remained significantly correlated with target
location (r = .45) and optimal path (r = .42). Thus, the
monkeys continued to anticipate the movement of the oc-
cluded target, albeit with less accuracy (i.e., more noise) in
approximating the optimal path for a shot. Again, these
results compare favorably with findings from human par-
ticipants (visible condition: r = .39 and .46, respectively),
2 This number of trials was selected to maximize the number of
responses obtained without boring or fatiguing the students. Per-
formance on this relatively simple task did not change across trials,
suggesting no need for additional training or testing of human
participants.
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as is illustrated in Figure 2, with a shot generated for the
experimental condition using the regression coefficients ob-
tained in the analysis.
displacement of an unperceived stimulus, albeit less accu-
rately than when more perceptual information is available to
them (as was the case for human performance as well).
Discussion
Three basic findings emerged from Experiment 4: (a) The
subjects continued to respond to target stimuli, even when
the target disappeared behind the occluder; (b) these re-
sponses were not haphazard but were similar to shots fired
at targets that were visible; and (c) performance by the
monkeys was qualitatively comparable to that of humans,
whether or not the target was visible. These results indicate
that the monkeys, like the humans, were capable of extrap-
olating the trajectory of an occluded target by using a less-
than-perfect internal representation of its intermediate
points of movement. Because the hit rate was based on only
those shots that were initiated while the target was still
behind the occluder, we have ruled out the possibility that
subjects were simply lying in wait and firing shots only after
the target had reappeared.
Moreover, as indicated by the correlational data, the sub-
jects did not simply fire "blindly" ahead of the occluded
target; rather, their shots tended to be accurate approxima-
tions of the appropriate shot given the inferred position,
direction, and speed of the target's movement. For any
given shot fired while the target was occluded, its angle was
compared with the optimal angle. Shooting ahead of the
target without regard for location, heading, and speed of
movement behind the occluder would not likely result in
shot angles that correlate significantly with an angle (the
optimal one) that is empirically determined by these same
factors.
It is noteworthy that all participants, regardless of species,
fired at targets even on the first trials in which the targets
passed behind the occluder. Thus, although training and
experience clearly impact performance (e.g., learning that a
target moves predictably, improving the psychomotor skills
required for accurate responding), knowledge that an oc-
cluded target could nonetheless be shot did not require
special training or reinforced history. Humans and monkeys
alike responded accurately, that is, as if the cardboard mask
merely obscured a portion of otherwise normal target
movement.
The general shot angle used by subjects, as depicted in
Figure 2, indicates that when the target cannot be seen,
humans do tend to overshoot the point of intersection,
whereas monkeys tend to undershoot the point of intersec-
tion. This result may be due to differences in representing
the speed of target movement (see below).
Together, these results suggest that the monkeys were
able to represent, though imperfectly, the intermediate tar-
get position or positions between the entry and exit points of
the mask. That is, monkeys like humans knew that the target
was still moving on the screen and that it could be shot even
when it was not visible. The subjects' performance on the
experimental condition of the LASER task indicates that
rhesus monkeys are capable of representing the invisible
General Discussion
In this series of experiments, we have demonstrated that
rhesus monkeys are capable of extrapolating movement.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest, but do not
confirm, that this extrapolation involves the use of an in-
ternal representation of the target's invisible movements.
Interestingly, subjects generalized this extrapolative process
from familiar to novel probe trials in the HOLE task.
Subjects' less-than-perfect estimates of the target's exit
point in the invisible condition of the HOLE task was likely
due to the requirement of keeping the cursor moving in
order to have the target emerge or reappear from the oc-
cluded region. That subjects' estimates were skewed even
when the target's movement through the hole was visible
supports this interpretation.
Although the monkeys had extensive training on the
HOLE task, it is untenable to suggest that their performance
in Experiment 3 was based on the use of an associative
process. Subjects' novel probe performance would have
been at levels equal to or even less than chance (due to
overlearning) if this had been the case. Similarly, perfor-
mance on even the first trials of Experiment 4 belies the
interpretation that the subjects required specific stimulus-
response reinforcement experience in order to solve the
novel problems introduced by an occluder.
In contrast, the monkeys' performance in the experimen-
tal condition of the LASER task demonstrates that they are
capable of representing and, hence, inferring invisible dis-
placement. It is interesting to note that both the monkeys'
and the humans' performance demonstrates that represent-
ing internally the invisible displacements of a target moving
in a zigzag pattern is not an easy task, nor one that is
perfectly accomplished. Although subjects missed the target
frequently, they were clearly using shot angles that reflected
a relatively accurate estimation of where the target was
located and heading behind the occluder, as is evident in the
significant correlation between their shot angles and the
optimal shot angle. Subjects' average hit rate of about 25%
in the occluded condition could be taken to reflect a less
than perfect representation of the target's speed or zigzag
motion. It would not be surprising if subjects were misrep-
resenting speed to some extent. Finke and his colleagues
(Finke, Freyd, & Shyi, 1986; Freyd & Finke, 1984) have
conducted several studies demonstrating that humans over-
estimate the movements of an object in their representa-
tions. This phenomenon of representational momentum sup-
ports our findings for the humans (as seen in Figure 2) and
may offer some insights into the nature of the monkeys'
representations of movement as well.
Tracking and Extrapolation Studies
The similarity of HOLE and LASER to extrapolation
tasks (Etienne, 1984; Krushinsky, 1990) and infant visual
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trackingtasks(seeBremner,1985,andHams,1987,for
reviews)isevident,buttherearesomesignificantdiffer-
ences.In noneof theseprevioustasksis thesubjectever
requiredtogiveanestimateof targetreappearancethatis
anymoreprecisethansimply"theothersideof theoc-
cluder,"noristheobject'spathofmovementanythingother
thanlinearand,generally,familiar(butseeNelson,1971).
Theuseof suchproceduresmakesforconditionsthatare
highlyconduciveto associativeorlocallearning.
TheHOLEtaskallowssubjectsto producearelatively
precisestimateofwhereontheothersideof theoccluder
targetswithnovelentrypointtrajectorieswill reappear.
Becausetheoccluderisacircle,therearemoredegreesof
freedominvolvedindeterminingthelocationof targetre-
appearance.It isnotsimplyanexpectationf targetreap-
pearanceor eventprediction(Bremner,1985;Goldberg,
1976)thatisbeingtestedbutanestimationofaspecificexit
pointlocation,outof arangeofpossiblexitpoints,given
a novelentrypointtrajectory.FortheLASERtask,the
patternof targetmovementis a zigzag,ofteninvolving
unseendeflections,andsubjectsareallowedto (anddid)
respondtothetargetwhileit remainedoccluded.Subjects
firedshotsaheadofaswellasintotheoccluder,suggesting
thattheywerenotsimplyfiringatsomeanticipatedlocation
of targetreappearancebutat wheretheyestimatedthe
target'slocationandheadingbehindtheoccluderwouldbe.
ThesefeaturesoftheHOLEandLASERtasksofferamore
sensitivevaluationof subjects'abilityto extrapolateand
representunseenmovement.
Object Permanence
Having demonstrated that rhesus monkeys can represent
internally the invisible displacements of a moving target in
target prediction tasks, why then do monkeys fail on invis-
ible displacement tasks used in object permanence research
(deBlois & Novak, 1994)? The answer to this question is as
yet unclear, but we have some tentative suggestions with
regard to differences in task demand and the experience of
the subjects used.
Task demand. The target prediction and object perma-
nence paradigms may likely require subjects to use different
information. In target prediction tasks, subjects need to
respond in anticipation of target movement, whereas sub-
jects in invisible displacement tasks need to reconstruct the
path of object movement. This difference in prospective and
retrospective processing (Dumas, 1992) may require sub-
jects to utilize different information (but see Goulet, Dore,
& Rousseau, 1994).
Alternatively, the HOLE and LASER tasks seem to be
more participatory for the monkeys than object permanence
tasks. Our subjects, when they chose to work, were at every
point involved in the task. That is, they were not required to
observe a sequence of events passively and then make a
response, but they were actively involved in the process of
each task: trying to catch a moving target or trying to fire a
shot at a moving target. Because the HOLE and LASER
tasks are inherently dynamic (i.e., moving) tasks, the mon-
keys likely had more opportunity to learn about the dynam-
ics of stimulus movement and, hence, the properties of
occlusion. Washburn (1993) noted that tasks with moving
as opposed to stationary stimuli seem to improve perfor-
mance because they present more of a challenge to the
monkeys and result in increased attention. This may have
contributed further to the monkeys' performance in our set
of experiments.
The possibility that differences in task demand may in-
fluence the solution of an invisible displacement problem
suggests that the ability to represent invisible displacement
may be constrained by other cognitive variables; that is, it
may not be as general or robust a capacity (at least at certain
points of ontogenetic or phylogenetic development) as tra-
ditionally thought. Because the object permanence para-
digm has been the only paradigm used to define invisible
displacement and to test subjects' ability to infer it, it is not
clear that rhesus monkeys' failure on invisible displacement
tasks is due to a complete lack of representational capacity
(Dumas, 1992; Natale & Antinucci, 1989). Infants who
appear to be able to solve invisible displacement tasks do
not necessarily solve all types of transposition problems, the
solutions of which are also believed to rest on the ability to
represent unseen movement. In studying infants' perfor-
mance on invisible displacement and transposition prob-
lems, Sophian (1985) suggested that attentionai factors may
contribute to the difficulty that infants experience on some
transposition problems. Performance on object permanence
tasks has often been found to be differentially affected by
the type of container used to transfer the food object, the
type of occluder used, the depth of the occlusion, and even
the testing environment (see Bremner, 1985, for review).
Furthermore, Baiilargeon's (1986, 1987) creative use of
different testing procedures has led to results that put into
question the relatively late age at which Piaget (1954)
asserted object permanence to be possessed. Hence, the
expression of representational capacity may be constrained
by other cognitive or perceptual processes as evidenced
through performance in tasks with different demands.
Subject variables. Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991b)
noted that training and testing rhesus macaques on the
computer-testing paradigm rather than with traditional,
manual procedures has resulted in previously unprecedented
performance on a variety of tasks. Learning set, transfer
index, and mediational scores were both reliably higher and
qualitatively different for the monkeys on the LRC-CTS
than with those studied previously with the Wisconsin Gen-
eral Testing Apparatus (WGTA; e.g., Harlow, 1949). That
is, the rhesus monkeys evidenced a capacity for relational
learning, whereas prior research had defined the species as
restricted to associative learning (see Washburn & Rum-
baugh, 1991b, for a discussion of these issues). Such a result
is made even more surprising given that LRC-CTS training
requires the monkeys to overcome the problems of spatial
discontiguity and the use of computer-generated, planimet-
ric stimuli. Both of these obstacles have resulted in com-
promised learning by rhesus macaques and other monkey
species tested in traditional paradigms (e.g., Meyer,
Treichler, & Meyer, 1965).
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Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991b) suggested that the
improved performance of the monkeys may be due to sev-
eral factors that are inherent in the LRC-CTS procedure,
such as (a) the ability to reduce the intertrial interval, which
improved transfer in the mediational task, and (b) allowing
subjects to work at their own pace, which may have resulted
in performing on the tasks at times when their motivation to
work and attention was high. As important, however, is the
suggestion that extensive experience with the CTS has
resulted in qualitative shifts in the capabilities of the test-
wise rhesus monkeys. Those monkeys have demonstrated
numerous competencies that were previously believed to be
unique to humans and apes (e.g., target prediction, symbol
learning, perceived control, and Stroop-like effects).
The streamlined nature of the LRC-CTS and the unique
testing environment that it affords may have contributed to
the qualitatively different performance the monkeys in our
HOLE and LASER experiments demonstrated compared
with previous studies (e.g., deBlois & Novak, 1994). It is
also likely, however, that extensive LRC-CTS experience
may have simply evoked qualitatively different perfor-
mance capabilities from the rhesus macaques in our exper-
iments. As a result, monkeys with extensive experience with
the CTS may be more likely to infer invisible displacement
than the rhesus macaques in other experiments. Whether or
not the CTS-trained rhesus can infer invisible displacement
outside the context of the computerized testing system is an
interesting question to pursue in future research.
Paradigmatic Alternatives
The results of our experiments reflect the great poten-
tial that the computerized target prediction paradigm
holds for investigating movement representation in hu-
man and nonhuman primates. As is evident from the
variety of tasks used to test object permanence in hu-
mans, the use of the object permanence paradigm on
nonhuman primates, though extremely valuable, needs to
be augmented with other testing paradigms. By doing so,
a better understanding of the varied manifestations of
movement representation can be gained. More investiga-
tion is needed to understand the constraints on the ex-
pression of representational capacity, the experience that
may or may not be required for such an expression, and
the nature of the representation itself.
In conclusion, the nature of our tasks, use of a comput-
erized testing paradigm, and the experience of the monkeys
seem to have opened the door to elucidating their ability to
represent internally the invisible displacements of a moving
target. From the results of this study and those of object
permanence studies, it seems likely that representing invis-
ible displacement may not be a binary capacity, which one
has or does not have, but rather is a capacity that might be
more or less general depending on the species and, hence,
more or less sensitive to particular task demands. Rhesus
macaques apparently function under particular constraints
which the WGTA-based object permanence paradigm has
not, heretofore, been able to circumvent.
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